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Abstract
The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations
are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance
relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a ten-
sion: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward’s popular inter-
ventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver’s mutual manipulability account of
constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the
incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views
in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level rela-
tions without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed
interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves
the problem.
1. INTRODUCTION
On mechanistic views of explanation (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000), good
explanations in the biological sciences characterize mechanisms: entities with
specific roles, composed by other entities that interact causally. In this paper
I discuss a problem that arises frequently in discussions about mechanisms. I
articulate the problem as a tension between three plausible views:
(1) The interventionist view of causation (Woodward, 2003), according to which
ideal interventions, i.e., manipulations that change the value of one vari-
able X and produce a change in another variable Y, controlling for other
influences, are necessary and sufficient for X to be a direct cause of Y.
(2) The mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance (Craver, 2007), ac-
cording to which we can know whether a component is constitutively rele-
vant in a mechanism by finding an experimental intervention on the com-
ponent that produces a change in the mechanism, and also the other way
around.
(3) The incoherence of inter-level causation, the idea that causal relations between
entities at different levels, such as a mechanism and its components, pro-
duce problematic redundant and cyclic causal structures.
My aim is not to argue independently for (1)-(3). My interest is to offer an ac-
count of how they fit together. I have two main reasons. First, the three views
have reached a prominent status in the mechanisms literature. Appeals to inter-
level causation in explanations often raise concerns for philosophers of science,
and Craver’s mutual manipulability account and Woodward’s interventionism
are mandatory starting points for discussions about explanation in the life sci-
ences, even when critics disagree with them (for instance, Waskan, 2011; Fagan,
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2012; Leuridan, 2012; Franklin-Hall, in press). Hence, it is useful to explore their
relations, and whether they are consistent, to help move the discussion forward.
The second reason is more substantive: the three views jointly offer an ac-
count of experimental practices that it is worth preserving. In the life sciences,
scientists often try to offer causal explanations (as opposed to mere correlations)
and often perform experiments to identify components of systems. These prac-
tices are so common that it would be good, to say the least, if philosophers of
science could offer a story to make sense of them and/or assess them critically.
Not having such a story would lead to an undesirable gap, which would suggest
that the practices lack proper philosophical foundations, or that philosophers of
science have no concern for what scientists actually do. We can interpret these
three views as a contribution to fill that gap. And even though there are cer-
tainly alternatives to each view (and I spend some time discussing some of them
in section 4), it is not clear whether such alternatives serve this epistemological
purpose.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I unpack (1),
(2), and (3) and explain the tension in detail, showing how the views seem to form
an inconsistent triad, in the sense that accepting any two entails the negation of
the third. At the end of the section, I discuss their relation with the basic mech-
anistic view. In section 3 I attempt to dissolve the tension. I show an alternative
way of understanding the relation between mechanisms and their components
using the notion of “fat-handed” intervention. I argue that the interventions that
reveal constitutive relevance are fat-handed interventions. From this claim two
things follow. On the one hand, it follows that (1), (2) and (3) are not mutually in-
consistent. On the other hand, (1), (2), and the claim about fat-handedness entail
that there is no inter-level causation within a mechanism. Finally, in section 4, I
review the consequences and unwanted costs of rejecting (1), (2), or (3) to avoid
the inconsistency.
2. MUTUAL MANIPULABILITY, INTERVENTIONISM AND INTER-LEVEL CAUSA-
TION
Mechanistic views of explanation have earned an important place in philosophy
of biology and neuroscience. We can synthesize the insights of this view in three
main claims. First, mechanisms are bundles of structure and activity. For example,
Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000, p.3) define mechanisms as “entities and
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start
or set-up to finish or termination conditions”. This way of understanding expla-
nations integrates behaviors with physical structures and temporal dynamics. In
addition, mechanisms are causal structures. Their underlying behavior is produced
by a complex system of parts interacting causally (Glennan, 1996, p.52). Finally,
mechanisms are multi-level structures: “entities and activities in mechanisms are
organized together spatially, temporally, causally, and hierarchically” (Craver,
2007, pp.5-6).
The aforementioned mechanists would subscribe to versions of these three
claims, and henceforth I will refer to mechanistic explanation as a view that
embraces the three of them. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that different
mechanists use the notion of mechanism for different (and not obviously con-
sistent) purposes in metaphysics, explanation, and methodology (see Levy, 2013,
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for a discussion of these different purposes). In addition, there are differences be-
tween mechanistic views. For instance, in Glennan’s view, parts of mechanisms
interact according to “direct causal laws” (i.e., generalizations that support coun-
terfactuals) (Glennan, 1996, p.52), but Machamer, Darden, and Craver explicitly
reject this commitment (2000, p.4). On the other hand, Machamer, Darden, and
Craver (2000) explain causation in terms of “activities” (which is akin to produc-
tivity accounts of causation), whereas Craver (2007) subscribes to Woodward’s
interventionism (more on this on Section 2.2). I will begin characterizing the in-
terventionist view.
2.1. THE INTERVENTIONIST VIEW OF CAUSATION
One popular and widely endorsed way of understanding causation (at least in
philosophy of science) is Woodward’s interventionist view (also called the “ma-
nipulationist view”), which defines causation in terms of interventions. The in-
tuition is that if one “surgically” manipulates a variable X and that produces a
change in Y, it is only because there is a causal relationship between X and Y.
More precisely:
(M) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct cause
of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a possible intervention
on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y when one holds
fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. A necessary and sufficient
condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing cause of Y with respect to
variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y such that each
link in this path is a direct causal relationship; [. . . ], and that (ii) there be
some intervention on X that will change Y when all other variables in V
that are not on this path are fixed at some value. (Woodward, 2003, p.59)
Woodward’s idea is that given two variables X and Y, if, after fixing all other
variables, all we need to do to change Y is to wiggle X, then it means that X is
a cause of Y. It is worth clarifying that the condition of holding fixed other vari-
ables means that there is at least one assignment of values for all other Zi in V
such that some intervention on X will change Y. The condition does not require
that the change should occur under all assignments of values of Zi (Woodward,
2003, p.53). This hypothetical scenario represents experimental conditions in
which (ideally) other causal influences on Y are stable, allowing us to distinguish
the causal influence that an intervention on X has on Y. Now, what does it mean
to intervene on X? Woodward gives the following definition:
(M*) I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y iff
1. I causes X.
2. I acts as a switch for all other variables that cause X. That is, cer-
tain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases
to depend on the values of other variables that cause X and instead
depends only on the value taken by I.
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct
from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built
into the I X Y connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of
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Y that are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and
Y) and (b) any causes of Y that are between I and X and have no effect
on Y independently of X.
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that
is on a directed path that does not go through X. (Woodward, 2003, p.
98)
To get an intuitive idea of these conditions, consider the following reconstruc-
tion of one important case of causal discovery in medicine. In the 17th century,
Ignaz Semmelweis was puzzled about the large difference in mortality rates due
to puerperal fever in womenwhowere treated at two very similar maternity clin-
ics in Vienna. After ruling out explanations such as climate, he realized that at the
clinic with the highest mortality rate, women were treated by medical students
who were also performing autopsies. This led him to hypothesize that cadaveric
material was involved in causing the fever. And then, he established the policy
that students had to wash their hands after performing autopsies using a chlo-
rinated lime solution, which he found good to get rid of cadaveric smells. This
was a novel insight at the time, because the idea that germs could cause diseases
had not yet been developed. As a result, the mortality rate decreased dramat-
ically in the first clinic, and eventually was similar to that of the second clinic
(Semmelweis, 1983). Figures 1(a) and 1(b) represent this situation.
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Figure 1: Intervention and Causation
Suppose all the variables in Figure 1(a) are binary. Z represents whether the
medical students perform autopsies at the clinic; X represents whether the stu-
dents’ hands are contaminated with cadaveric material when they treat patients;
Y represents whether patients gets puerperal fever. In a graph representation, an
intervention can be seen as a variable within the system that alters the value of
the variable intervened upon (Pearl, 2000, p.70). This is shown in Figure 1(b). I
is the intervention of making students wash their hands in the chlorinated lime
solution. The double arrow represents the fact that the intervention’s causal in-
fluence is extrinsic to the system. Now, there is an observed correlation between
Z and Y. An ideal intervention would break the causal relation from Z to X
(represented by the crossed out arrow), making it irrelevant whether patients are
treated by students who do autopsies or not; and would also change the proba-
bility distribution of Y, which would mean that there is a causal relation between
X and Y.
An intervention is not ideal if it violates any of the conditions in (M*). Fig-
ures 2(a), (b), and (c) show violations of conditions (2), (3), and (4) respectively.
Suppose, for example, that the policy of washing hands only applies to half of
the students. In such a case, I would not break the arrow from Z to X (i.e, some
students with contaminated hands would still treat patients), so the intervention
is not ideal. This is represented in Figure 2(a). On the other hand, Figure 2(b)
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Figure 2: Violations of Conditions (M*)
represents a case in which the intervention changes both the purported cause
and the effect. For example, suspending all operations at the clinic would triv-
ially (but effectively) prevent students with contaminated hands from treating
patients, and patients from getting fever at the clinic. And Figure 2(c) could rep-
resent a similar situation, but with another causal intermediate between I and
Y. For a more recent discussion about these conditions, see Woodward (2014,
pp. 12-14). And for a more formally precise characterization of interventions in
causal graphs, see Eberhardt and Scheines (2007).
Whether interventionism counts as a complete story about the nature of cau-
sation is a contentious issue. Often, discussions about causation distinguish two
different (and competing) accounts: “difference-making” accounts (including in-
terventionism), on the one hand, which support the idea that causes make a dif-
ference to their effects; and “geometrical/mechanical” or “production” accounts,
on the other, which understand causation as a “connecting process” between
events (see Woodward, 2011, pp.411–413). For the purposes of this paper, I inter-
pret interventionism primarily as a theory about the semantics of causal claims,
which is the way in which Woodward presents it inMaking Things Happen (2003,
p.28). There are other interpretations, and I discuss them in Section 4.1. But as
a semantic theory, interventionism provides “truth conditions for claims about
total, direct, contributing, and actual causal relationships”(2003, p.95), and has
implications about the epistemology of causation, without further commitments
about the nature of causation.
One reason the interventionist view is popular among philosophers of sci-
ence is because it establishes a conceptual relation between causation and exper-
imental practices. In particular, in the context of discussions about explanatory
models in the biological sciences, it attempts to analyze the connection between
the results of controlled experiments and causal claims.
Specifying a mechanism requires identifying its components. It is desirable,
therefore, for an account of mechanistic explanation, to provide an account of
when a given entity is a component in a mechanism and when it is not; that is,
an account of constitutive relevance. Craver’s account, which I explain next, is the
mutual manipulability account, and it was developed in the context of interven-
tionism. This account is the second view in the inconsistent triad.
2.2. THE MUTUAL MANIPULABILITY ACCOUNT OF CONSTITUTIVE RELEVANCE
Craver’s mutual manipulability account offers a sufficient condition for constitu-
tive relevance. He says “a part is a component in a mechanism if one can change
the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to change the compo-
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nent and one can change the behavior of the component by intervening to change
the behavior of the mechanism as a whole” (Craver, 2007, p.141). I will unpack
this view using an example and some more precise definitions.
Different subfields of cognitive science approach the same phenomena from
different perspectives. According to Craver, we can describe multi-level mecha-
nisms of such phenomena integrating evidence from these subfields. Given some
phenomenon, the different subfields may provide evidence of how the mecha-
nism that produces it works at higher and lower levels. Craver uses evidence
about spatial memory encoding and retrieval to illustrate these points (Craver,
2007, p.165). Here I take the case of the well-studied phenomenon of face recog-
nition in humans:
1. Psychological studies of performance in face recognition. Behavioral experi-
ments in psychology provide evidence that people are particularly sensi-
tive to faces (Bruce & Young, 1986). We are able to distinguish and identify
hundreds of different faces, but are rarely so good at identifying other sorts
of objects. We can describe these experiments as taking place at a high
mechanistic level –the level of the whole organism.
2. Studies that identify brain structures involved in face recognition. At a lower
mechanistic level, imaging studies have consistently shown that subjects
presented with facial images have major activation of the fusiform gyrus,
and that activation is greater than observed in subjects presentedwith other
images (Meng, Cherian, Singal, & Sinha, 2012). Additionally, classic studies
(Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982) show that patients with damage
in the fusiform gyrus exhibit prosopagnosia, an inability to recognize fa-
miliar faces. Other imaging studies (Ishai, Schmidt, & Boesiger, 2005) find
activation within specific networks that include the fusiform gyrus when
subjects are asked to identify facial stimuli.
3. Studies about the activity of particular cells in face recognition tasks. At an even
lower level, vision scientists study the activity of particular cells recruited
in face recognition. For example, using fMRI, Tsao et al. (2006) identified a
face-selective region in macaques which they regard as topographically ho-
mologous to the human fusiform face area (located in the fusiform gyrus in
humans). Then, they did single-unit recordings in that area and were able
to identify cells with a 19:1 and 14:1 ratio of face-to-nonface object response.
Here are some features of Craver’s notion of “level”. First, levels in a mecha-
nism are not just levels of objects that compose other objects (e.g., atoms, molecules,
cells, systems, organisms, and societies). Although entities at lower levels are
smaller than entities at higher levels, they also need to be relevant to the higher
levels in terms of the activities they perform (more on this shortly). Second,
Craver’s view of levels is different from the view that levels are monolithic strata
identifiable in terms of size. On such a view, reality is a hierarchical structure that
exhibits regularities at different size scales (e.g., regularities at the atomic level,
molecular level, etc.). The problem for this view is that there are no well-defined
strata in cognitive science. Hence, levels in a mechanism have a more local signif-
icance: what each field contributes depends on the explanatory context, and the
relevance of entities at different levels must be determined case by case.
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Craver defines the relation between levels and components as follows. Let x
be an entity, for example, a cell in the fusiform gyrus, and f be the activity of
firing. Craver calls “acting entity” the performing of the activity by the entity,
which we can denote by fx. That is, fx is a firing neuron. I simplify Craver’s no-
tation: he uses “X’s f-ing” to refer to what I call here fx (a notation that has the
virtue of privileging activities over entities). Also, let s be a higher-level mecha-
nism, whose behavior ys is (at least partially) associated with fx. For example s
could be the subject in a face recognition experiment and y the activity of recog-
nizing a face. Thus we have:
(L) fx is at a lower mechanistic level than ys if and only if fx is a component
in the mechanism for ys. (Craver, 2007, p.189)
This notion of composition is thick: describing a component requires specifying
not only a part-whole relation between x and s, but also the activities f and y
that make x relevant to s. Merely being a cell in the fusiform gyrus, for instance,
is not sufficient to be a component in the mechanism for face recognition. The
cell has to be active when the subject performs the activity of face recognition to
be considered a component. In this notation, the problem of giving an account of
constitutive relevance is to establish conditions under which fx is a component
in the mechanism for ys.
In practice, myriad cases in neuroscience illustrate how scientists discover
mechanisms by identifying their lower-level components in inter-level experi-
ments. For example, the imaging experiments that provide evidence that the
fusiform gyrus is involved in face recognition (Ishai et al., 2005) are top-down ex-
periments: there is a higher-level intervention (i.e., the subject is presented with
facial stimuli) and a low-level detection technique (i.e., fMRI). Additionally, there
are bottom-up experiments. Lesions studies, such as Damasio’s (Damasio et al.,
1982), provide a set of examples: there is a low-level intervention (i.e., a lesion
that damages the fusiform gyrus) and a higher-level detection technique (i.e., a
behavioral experiment that reveals prosopagnosia). Consider also the case of
spatial memory discussed by Craver. It is known that cells in the hippocampus
are active at sustained rates when rats move inside a specific place field. These
studies are top-down, in the sense that there is a top-level intervention (i.e., the
rat is moving over the specified field) and a low-level detection technique (i.e.,
cell recording). Additionally, there are bottom-up experiments in which lesion-
ing a rat’s dorsal hippocampus impairs its navigation. Specifically, lesions in the
dorsal hippocampus cause spatial memory impairment in rats navigating the ra-
dial arm maze. Scientists’ conclusion is that the hippocampus plays a role in a
mechanism for spatial memory.
Drawing on the spatial memory example, Craver states that fx and ys aremu-
tually manipulable when it is possible to perform both bottom-up and top-down
interventions. Craver says “My working account of constitutive relevance is as
follows: a component is relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole
when one can wiggle the behavior of the whole by wiggling the behavior of the
component and one can wiggle the behavior of the component by wiggling the
behavior as a whole. The two are related as part to whole and they are mutually
manipulable” (2007, p. 153). And also “[fx] is constitutively relevant to [ys] if the
two are related as part to whole and the relata are mutually manipulable. There
should be some ideal intervention on f under which y changes, and there should
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be some ideal intervention on y under which f changes” (2007, p. 154). I state
this view and its relation to the notion of component as follows:
(MM1) fx and ys are mutually manipulable if and only if there is an ideal bottom-
up experimental intervention on fx that produces a detectable change in
ys; and there is an ideal top-down experimental intervention on ys that
produces a detectable change in fx.
(MM2) If fx and ys are mutually manipulable, and x is a part of s, then fx is a
component in the mechanism for ys.
Condition (MM2) is important because there are cases in which we can have
mutual manipulability of two variables but not a componential relation, such as
when there are causal loops. The parthood condition rules out this possibility.
On the other hand, as mentioned before, being a part is not sufficient for being
a component. For example, the hubcaps are parts of a car, but they are not a
component in the mechanism that makes the car run (Craver, 2007, p.140).
The definition of ideal intervention that Craver offers is as follows:
(I1c) The intervention I does not change ys directly;
(I2c) I does not change the value of some other variable f0x that changes the
value of ys except via the change introduced into fx;
(I3c) that I is not correlated with some other variable M that is causally indepen-
dent of I and also a cause of ys; and
(I4c) that I fixes the value of fx in such a way as to screen off the contribution of
fx’s other causes to the value of fx (Craver, 2007, p.154).
For Craver, mutual manipulability adds an important piece to mechanistic
accounts of explanation: it shows how to identify components in a mechanism,
a project that he regards as a “regulative ideal” in neuroscience. In his view,
scientists (should) aim for constitutive explanations that “describe all and only
the component entities, activities, properties, and organizational features that are
relevant to the multifaceted phenomenon to be explained” (Craver, 2007, p.111).
Now, the fact that mutual manipulability relies heavily on interventionism can
be seen as a problem, as I show next.
2.3. THE INCOHERENCE OF INTER-LEVEL CAUSATION
It is easy to notice that interventionism and the mutual manipulability view rely
on similar notions of ideal intervention. Leuridan (2012), for instance, argues that
constitutive relevance in Craver’s account threatens to imply causal relevance in
Woodward’s framework, by showing that conditions (I1c)-(I4c) imply conditions
1-4 in (M*). To see the similarly more generally, consider the way in which the
two notions are formulated: first, as definition (MM1) in section 2.2 shows, mu-
tual manipulability uses a notion of intervention that captures the fact that inter-
level experiments are controlled (i.e., all the non-intervened on variables should
be kept constant); and second, as (M) in section 2.1 shows, interventionism uses
a notion of intervention according to which interventions manipulate surgically
one variable to observe changes in another while holding all other variables con-
stant (i.e., interventions are controlled experiments).
If the two notions are essentially the same, then we have:
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(MM*) fx and ys are mutually manipulable if and only if fx is a contributing cause
of ys, and ys is a contributing cause of fx.2
Then, (MM*) and (MM2) and (L) entail the following inter-level causation thesis:
(ILC) If fx and ys are mutually manipulable, and x is a part of s, then fx is at a
lower mechanistic level than ys, fx is a contributing cause of ys, and ys is
a contributing cause of fx.
Mechanists in this debate don’t like inter-level causation. Craver’s critics take
it to be a problem for his mutual manipulability account. And Craver and Bech-
tel offer arguments to avoid it. Craver says “many philosophers have held that
causes and effects must be logically independent. If one endorses this restric-
tion on causal relations, then one should balk at positing a causal relationship
between constitutively related properties” (Craver, 2007, p.153) and “If one is
committed to the idea that causes must precede their effects, then constitutive
relationships are not causal relationships” (Craver, 2007, p.154). On the other
hand, Craver and Bechtel (Craver & Bechtel, 2007) attempt to explain (away)
inter-level causal relations proposing the notion of “mechanistically mediated
effects”. Such effects are “hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where
causal relations are exclusively intralevel”(Craver & Bechtel, 2007, p.547), and
inter-level relations are explained in terms of constitution, which metaphysically
excludes causation.
Why is inter-level causation so undesirable? In the context of mechanisms, I
can articulate two unwanted consequences:
1. Redundancy Problem. Suppose physical events are fully caused by other
physical events. This physicalist assumption is intuitive when we think
of the lower levels of reality (e.g., particles exerting forces, colliding, and
transferring quantities). Suppose specifically, that some fx has a sufficient
same-level set of causes, represented by ry. Now, suppose we find that
fx and ys are mutually manipulable, and x is a part of s. Then, by (ILC),
it follows that fx is at a lower mechanistic level than ys, and ys is a con-
tributing cause of fx. However, given that ry sufficiently causes fx (by
assumption), fx has redundant causes. For example, if all neural activity
is caused by cellular activity (e.g., neurons’ firing), then higher-level struc-
tures (e.g., cerebellum, hippocampus, cortex, etc.) would have redundant
causal influences (e.g., it would be redundant to say that the cortex has
some regulatory function on other structures). Causal redundancy itself is
not a problem in general. Many events are overdetermined (e.g., one bullet
might be sufficient cause of Jones’ death, and all the other bullets overde-
termine his death). The problem is that if (ILC) is true, then all the activi-
ties of a mechanism’s components are redundant, and that sort of relation
might be different from more intuitive cases of overdetermination. This is
an argument in the vicinity of the exclusion problem in philosophy of mind
(Kim, 1989). The problem is whether supervening entities (e.g., minds) can
have top-down causal influence on lower level physical entities. Consider
the closure principle: for every physical property P, there is a set of suffi-
cient physical causes P⇤. Suppose M is a mental event that supervenes on
2Given that all direct causes are contributing causes, I write the conclusion in terms of the latter.
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(is not reducible to) P. It follows from the closure principle that either M
overdetermines P or that M is not a contributing cause of P. For recent dis-
cussions about Kim’s exclusion problem in the context of interventionism
see Baumgartner (2009) and Woodward (2014).
2. Cyclicity Problem. Suppose, again, that we find that fx and ys are mutually
manipulable, and x is a part of s. Then, by (ILC), it follows that fx is a
contributing cause of ys, and ys is a contributing cause of fx. One plau-
sible interpretation is that causal cycles represent feedback relations in the
mechanism. If we add a temporal variable, the cycle means that at t1, fx is
a contributing cause of ys, and t2, ys is a contributing cause of fx. There are
cases of such feedback relations in biological organisms. One clear example
is when organisms exhibit negative feedback loops that allow them to reg-
ulate the levels of certain values (e.g., temperature) around one target set
point, as in homeostasis (Bechtel, 2011). However, the temporal order re-
quired to make such an interpretation plausible is not available in Craver’s
understanding of levels, because the activities that constitute higher-order
behavior are supposed to be synchronic with the behavior. Hence, it is
unlikely that the relation between a mechanism and all its components is
feedback. The other alternative is to interpret such causal cycles synchron-
ically, but there is also a problem: if inter-level relations between fx and ys
are causal, then s could not y at t, unless x could f at t; and it is puzzling
to say that x was also caused to f at the same time t by s’s being able to y.
The reason for puzzlement comes from the intuitive principle that an entity
cannot be caused to have a causal power at t and also exercise that causal
power at t. This form of argument comes from Kim (1999, pp.28-29).
I have presented one argument: mutual manipulability and interventionism
(in the way in which I stated them) entail that there are inter-level causes. Negat-
ing the conclusion of this argument (as I contend we should), leads to an in-
consistent set of claims. The other two directions of the inconsistency are now
easier to see: if we accept mutual manipulability and reject inter-level causes,
then we need an alternative theory of causation in which the interventions that
reveal a mutual manipulability relation between two entities are not sufficient
for there to be a causal relation between them; and if we accept intervention-
ism without inter-level causes, then we have to reject the mutual manipulability
account. These alternatives are discussed in more detail in sections 4.1 and 4.2
respectively.
2.4. THE INCONSISTENT TRIAD IN RELATION TO THE BASIC MECHANISTIC VIEW
Let me say how these three views relate to the three features of the mechanistic
view presented at the beginning of this section. I said mechanisms are bundles of
structure and function, and they are also causal structures. Most mechanists can
agree about such tenets. Now, the details of what it means for two components
of a mechanism to be in a causal relation is an additional issue, which could be
addressed with different theories of causation. Some mechanists appeal to inter-
ventionism, but it is not necessary. Indeed, the seminal papers in the literature
(Glennan, 1996; Machamer et al., 2000) don’t appeal to it. Nonetheless, in addi-
tion to providing semantics for causal claims, interventionism can be used to tell
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a story about the discovery of causal relations that strengthens the epistemology
of mechanisms. This advantage does not come for free, because the interpreta-
tion of interventionism also as a metaphysical theory is controversial (I discuss
this issue in section 4.1). However, if we displace interventionism, even if we
could perhaps use more metaphysically robust accounts of causation, we would
also have to think about how to fill the epistemological gap.
The other feature I mentioned is that mechanisms are multi-level structures.
We can understand this characteristic as an inference to the best explanation:
the best explanation for the success of practices such as interference and detec-
tion experiments described in section 2.2 is that phenomena in the life sciences
take place at different levels. That is, if we assume that mechanisms are multi-
level, then such experimental practices can be naturally described as helping to
break down the different levels of a system. Additionally, viewing mechanisms
as multi-level is useful to understand how the different life sciences relate to each
other. In cognitive science, for example, different disciplines study the same sub-
ject matter broadly speaking (i.e., cognition) using different methodological ap-
proaches, which according to the aforementioned multi-level assumption, take
place at different levels (e.g., cognitive psychology studies mental processes at
the organism level, whereas neuroscience studies phenomena at the nervous sys-
tem level). Mutual manipulability tries to offer a general account of the discov-
ery process of such levels by finding components and subcomponents, and takes
some steps in suggesting how the results from different disciplines could be in-
tegrated to construct more robust explanations.
Finally, the idea that there are no inter-level causes is central to the mechanis-
tic view. In particular, there is a strong way of understanding inter-level causes
that makes them anti-mechanistic. In such a sense, if there are non-redundant
top-down causes, then it means that they are produced by higher-level entities
that are causally independent from their parts. Mechanists try to describe the
world while avoiding that. This is true not only for the so called “new mecha-
nists”, but also for a more traditional view that regards nature as a machine that
we can decompose and whose behavior can be fully explained in terms of its
inner workings. Allowing for top-down causes in that strong sense in our expla-
nations implies that some aspects of systems escape a characterization in terms
of their structure and organization. Hence, when the problem arises, mechanists
try to findways of explaining away apparent top-down causes, making them less
suspicious.
In short, interventionism and mutual manipulability tell a story about the
epistemology of mechanisms qua causal multi-level structures. And a view of
reality in which we can explain phenomena without appealing to mysterious
inter-level causes is central to the mechanist project. The reader might disagree
about how important these commitments are or should be. But I hope I have
made a clear case for their tension. Also, stating the problem in this way can
help to elucidate where the reader’s commitments lie, even in disagreement with
my proposal to dissolve the tension.
In the next section I present the proposal.
3. AN ATTEMPT TO DISSOLVE THE INCONSISTENCY
In this section, I offer an interpretation of the relation between mechanisms and
their components in which there is no inter-level causation. My strategy is as
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follows. I show that in the interventionist view defined by (M), for there to be
a causal relation from one mechanistic level to other, there has to be at least an
ideal intervention (on one level with observable changes at the other level) that
satisfies condition (M*). However, I argue that all interventions that provide ev-
idence of constitutive relevance relations are not ideal interventions in the sense
of (M*), because they are “fat-handed” interventions. I begin giving some details
about how to model mechanisms in causal graphs (section 3.1). Then I move
on to an explanation of inter-level relations appealing to fat-handedness (section
3.2). After that, I can present straightforwardly an argument that shows that the
inter-level causation thesis (ILC) is false (section 3.3).
3.1. REPRESENTING MECHANISMS IN CAUSAL GRAPHS
Recall that in section 2.2 I introduced the notation activityentity (e.g., fx) to refer
to particular activities that components of a mechanism can perform. A mech-
anism is constituted by several entities E = {s, x, y, ...}, each of which has an
associated set of activities {y, a, b, ...} (e.g., synthesize proteins, transmit action
potentials, carry out long-term potentiation). There are several cases in which
parts that are clearly demarcated from a physiological perspective are involved
in several different activities. For example, the fusiform gyrus is associated with
face recognition, but also with performance in word recognition, color identifi-
cation, or within-category identification. Another example is the basal ganglia,
a group of nuclei connected to several other brain regions which are associated
with a variety of activities: one of them, the caudate nucleus, has been associated
with language comprehension, emotions, OCD, and memory.
We can represent some aspects of mechanisms in causal graphs. My aim here
is to provide a graphic representation to clarify my arguments, more than to pro-
vide a complete general framework to model mechanisms formally. First, I ex-
plain how to represent activities, entities, and part-whole relations. And in the
next section I explain how to represent constitutive relevance.
First, I make one simplifying assumption: I take each activityentity as a vari-
able, values of which refer to quantities of aspects of the activity. For example,
if we are representing a neuron’s firing, the variable could be its firing rate. Or
if we are representing a higher-level capacity, such as face recognition, the vari-
able could be a measure of performance in discriminating seen and unseen faces.
Thus, a mechanism can be represented as a graph G = (AE,R), where AE is
the set of nodes (e.g., if x is an entity that performs two different activities f
and a, then fx and ax would be different nodes in the graph), and R is a set
of edges between nodes that represent causal relations. Figure 3 shows a three-
level mechanism. The differences in vertical location of the variables represent
different part-whole relations.
Let me make two important clarifications. First, in biological systems the
relation between the variables cannot be so strict as to define a completely hier-
archical structure (e.g., a tree in which every node has exactly one parent). Here
is an example. Neural pathways are composed of bundles of neurons and con-
nect different regions in the nervous system. In terms of a part-whole relation,
neurons are at a lower level than pathways. Now, consider that the same neuron
(e.g., p) can be connected to thousands of presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons.
Hence, a single neuron can be part of different pathways (e.g., x and y) that are
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ry
Figure 3: Mechanism in Causal Graph
not hierarchically related.
Second, someonemight beworried that the assumption of taking an activityentity
to be a variable sweeps a metaphysical problem under the carpet, because it says
nothing about the ontology of the entities. I think that while this might be true for
the interventionist (who defines causation as a relation between variables), it is
not true for the mechanist. The mechanist, I take it, is committed to the assump-
tion that there is a fact of the matter about what constitutes a part in a biological
system. Such systems have extension and location in space, and therefore they
are physical entities, not mental, abstract, or functional. This is implicit in the
representation, because we can derive a part-whole structure from the graph of a
mechanism. For example, take the graph in Figure 3. Let the subscripts defining
the entities be the nodes (i.e. remove the greek letters defining activities), remove
causal connections, and connect each node to their immediate upper level. Let
the edges of this new structure represent an irreflexive, asymmetric, and transi-
tive relation. The resulting graph would represent the part-whole relationships
between the entities of the mechanism (basic mereology uses reflexivity instead
of irreflexivity as a primitive notion, but in Biology it is unusual to say that some-
thing is a part of itself). The relation defines a strict partial order, which implies
that one node (e.g., p) could be descendant of two other nodes (e.g., x and y). Two
clarifications: first part-whole relations are one condition for (and shouldn’t be
identified with) constitutive relevance relations (see MM2); second, the fact that
the variables can be organized as a strict partial order is not sufficient to conclude
that they stand for physical entities, but it is necessary constraint.
Nonetheless, being committed to the existence of parts does not thereby com-
mit the mechanist to a particular view on the organization of neural systems. For
example, some philosophers and scientists argue that the way in which we cur-
rently classify some brain areas as ‘parts’ is mistaken, and therefore we should
focus on networks rather than localized structures. If they are right, however, the
mechanistic view would not be necessarily threatened. In this scenario, mecha-
nisms would have to be decomposed in different units (e.g., clusters of structures
such as neurons), but would still be subject to part-whole relations.
A mechanist can represent results of her enterprise as a graph G. Proce-
dures (e.g., staining tissue) can help to identify entities and part-whole relations
(strictly speaking, these procedures are not interventions on the mechanism as
defined by (MM1), because they are intended to identify structure and not ma-
nipulate activities). Other entities are observable with (or inferred based on) the
same procedures that lead to the discovery of the relations between activities
(e.g., the visual system contains multiple pathways that go from the optic nerve
to visual cortex in the back of the brain, which are identifiable by dissociating
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their functions). The graph is constructed by intervening experimentally in AE
and observing dependencies. Consider the example in Figure 4. Suppose x, y,
and z are parts of s. Intervention I manipulates the value of fx. The intervention
blocks the influence from gz to fx (satisfying condition 2 in (M*)). This allows us
to infer whether fx has a causal influence on ry ruling out spurious correlations
between fx and ry due to gz.
ys
fx ry
gz
I 6
Figure 4: Interventions
I turn now to the question of how to represent constitutive relevance.
3.2. INTER-LEVEL RELATIONS AND FAT-HANDEDNESS
We can represent constitutive relevance (section 2.2) as follows. Let I1 be some
experimental intervention on fx, and suppose we observe that the value of ys
changes to ys⇤. Also, let I2 be an experimental intervention on ys, and suppose
we observe that the value of fx changes to fx⇤. This is shown in Figures 5(a) and
5(b) respectively.
ys⇤
fx ryI1
(a)
ys
fx⇤ ry
I2
(b)
ys
fx ry
(c)
Figure 5: Mutual manipulability
A prima facie conclusion from each of these experiments is that there are
inter-level causal relationships (which should be depicted by causal arrows, as
in Figure 4). This is, however, the problem that we want to avoid. I proceed in
two steps. I first look at what we are required to account for if we want to avoid
such relations, which leads to some changes in the graph representation and def-
initions. And second, I argue that we are justified in making such changes on
metaphysical grounds.
Suppose we deny that the interventions I1 and I2 and corresponding changes
in values for ys and fx mean that there are inter-level causal relations between
ys and fx. Something that we cannot deny, however, is that these experiments
succeed in providing correlational data between the two variables. To represent
correlations in causal graphs, a standard is to use dotted bidirectional arrows.
This is shown in Figure 5(c). I represent inter-level relations with correlational
arrows (but of course, not all correlational arrows stand for inter-level relations).
We have to explain this correlation, because in a causal system there is no
correlation without causation (i.e., if there is no causation between the correlated
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events, then there are hidden factors exerting causal influences). This idea is
sometimes referred to as Reichenbach’s common-cause assumption. In the example
the assumption is as follows:
(R) If there is a correlation between fx and ys, then (a) fx is a cause of ys, or (b)
ys is a cause of fx, or (c) there is a common cause for fx and ys.
According to (R), a causal system that accounts for the correlation of fx and ys
has to satisfy at least one of the three disjuncts. Disjuncts (a) and (b) should be
rejected given that wewant to avoid inter-level causation. Hence, the only option
is to accept disjunct (c).
A common cause for two events can be understood as a “fat-handed” inter-
vention. Woodward defines fat-handed interventions as those “affecting not just
X and other variables lying on the route from I to X to Y, but also other variables
that are not on this route and that affect Y” (Woodward, 2008a, p.209). In the con-
text of the quotation, he does not intend to offer a formally precise definition, but
I interpret his idea in terms of the definitions given in section 2.1 as follows: if I is
a fat-handed intervention, then I does not satisfy either condition 3 or condition
4, but satisfies condition 1 and condition 2 in (M*).
Some straightforward examples of fat-handed interventions are those inwhich
the intervention does not have a localized effect on one single variable (i.e., it
changes several simultaneously) because the intervening instrument is not pre-
cise enough. In medicine, treatments with side effects have that characteristic:
chemotherapy drugs, for example, may kill cancer cells effectively, but they also
destroy healthy cells. Another example is antidepressants that have an effect
on serotonin levels, but also lead to weight gain. In these cases, it is possible to
imagine interventions that could have amore localized effect on a target variable,
avoiding the unwanted side effects.
Fat-handed interventions deviate from the normative ideal, but this does not
mean that they don’t provide useful information. Often they are done in ex-
ploratory stages, and give insights to develop more refined experiments. And
sometimes they change variables that are not relevant to the current study. Hence,
asWoodward acknowledges (Woodward, 2004), it would be too strong to say that
prediction is only attainable through ideal interventions, because accumulating
evidence from several fat-handed interventions could also provide it.
Now, it is possible to quantify the same physical event in different ways, using
different variables. In such contexts, an intervention that manipulates one of
such variables necessarilymanipulates the other. This, I think, is the right way of
thinking about interventions on variables that quantify different aspects of a part-
whole relationship. That is, in the part-whole case, interventions are necessarily
fat-handed: the intervention on the variable related to a part is also necessarily
an intervention on the variable related to the whole, and vice versa. We should
not conceive the intervention as being on one variable or the other, but on both at
once. The difference with the examples mentioned before (i.e., treatments with
side-effects), is that in the part-whole case (and therefore in the mechanistic case),
it is not possible that a more precise instrument would make the intervention not
fat-handed. Both cases are structurally the same, however, in the sense that there
are two variables that change simultaneously.
More precisely, in the part-whole case, condition 3 in (M*) is violated. An
intervention I causes fx (condition 1), and suppress other causal influences on fx
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(condition 2), but does not satisfy condition 3, because it directly causes ys (more
on this below). This is sufficient to render the intervention non-ideal. There is
another case of a non-ideal intervention in the vicinity. Imagine a case such as
the one depicted in Figure 2(c), but in which X is a higher-level variable and Z
and Y are lower level variables. In such a case, condition 4 is violated because
I and Z are correlated (I causes Z), and therefore the intervention is non-ideal.
The important case for the present discussion, however, is when condition 3 is
violated.
In short, I think the concept of fat-handed intervention is not only a logi-
cal alternative available to understand inter-level relations in an interventionist
framework. Also, it is one that we are justified in adopting, as I argue next.
I propose the following working definition of the relation between constitu-
tive relevance and interventions:
(F) If fx is a component in ys, then (i) any intervention I on fx is also necessar-
ily an intervention on ys, and (ii) any intervention I on ys is also necessarily
an intervention on fx.
This is shown in Figure 6.
ys
fx ry
I
Figure 6: Components and Fat-Handedness
(F) is a consequence of what I take the right metaphysical picture of mecha-
nisms to be: a mechanism’s activity and its components arranged and working
in the right way are the same physical event. As such, an intervention on a com-
ponent changes both the component and the whole. And an intervention on
the whole changes both the whole and at least one of its components. Nonethe-
less, even though the intervention counts as a single physical event, we can mea-
sure its effects either on the whole mechanism or the components using different
techniques (i.e., techniques that have different resolutions), and register them in
changes in variables at different levels. Thus, ys is a higher-level variable because
some lower-resolution technique measures the state of the whole mechanism,
and fx is a lower-level variable because some other higher-resolution technique
measures the state of one component.
This does not necessarilymean that detection techniques are the only criterion
to individuate mechanistic levels. Composition is also required: if fx and ry are
components in the samemechanism, andwe canmeasure changes in their values
with the same technique (or techniques with the same resolution), then they are
at the same mechanistic level (and the converse is not necessarily true).
I think previous arguments by (Craver, 2007) and Craver and Bechtel (Craver
& Bechtel, 2007) against inter-level causation (see section 2.3) require the same
metaphysical picture, but the authors don’t make that commitment explicit. Fur-
thermore, their arguments are incomplete as a solution to the problem because
they don’t explain how the underlying metaphysical picture relates with the in-
terventionist framework in away inwhich the problems in section 2.3 don’t arise.
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How does this metaphysical picture fit with the interventionist view of cau-
sation? In the interventionist’s semantics, causation is not a relation between en-
tities but between variables (this is also true in the causal graph representation).
Hence, to represent a change in a (variable for a) mechanism and one (variable
for one) of its components that results from the same event, we need to use two
simultaneous causal arrows on the two variables from the intervention. And
this is precisely what (F) expresses. If (F) is right, then (R) is true, because (F)
makes disjunct (c) true. In other words, the metaphysical picture implies that
the intervention changes the two variables at the same time. In the intervention-
ist semantics, this means that the relation between the two variables cannot be
causal, because saying that it is causal means that there is an ideal intervention
on one of them that has an effect on the other, but this cannot be the case, because
fat-handed interventions are not ideal.
Let me illustrate this idea with two examples. The first shows the general
idea. The second has a more mechanistic and biological feel.
Example 1. This is an example based on an example from Sperry (1980). You
push a tire (that is the intervention I), the tire moves (a change in ys measured in
terms of distance) and its rubber molecules also move (a change in fx measured
in terms of rotation of the molecules). You observe a correlation between the two
variables. However, there is no way of making the intervention without produc-
ing both effects. The intervention itself causes both. The marcrophysical proper-
ties of the tire depend on the properties of its rubber molecules, but this does not
imply that the high-level variable is reducible to the lower-level variable, since
rolling is a property of the tire as a whole, not of individual molecules.
Example 2. Consider a rough description of how aspirin works. You take an
aspirin (I) and it relieves your pain (a change in ys measured perhaps by a sub-
jective report about the intensity of your pain on a scale). Aspirin suppresses the
production of prostaglandins, which are associated with transmission of pain in-
formation to the brain. More specifically, aspirin inhibits cyclooxygenases COX-1
and COX-2, two enzymes required for the synthesis of prostaglandins (suppose
this is a change in fx). Now, it is not possible for the aspirin to relieve your
pain (higher-level variable)without suppressing the production of prostaglandins
(lower-level variable), or the other way around (controlling for other influences).
Your intervention at the upper level (i.e., you taking the aspirin) is also necessar-
ily an intervention at the lower level. For a longer discussion about this mecha-
nism see (Woodward, 2011, p.418–419).
Some clarifications. First, mutual manipulability between two variables alone
does not entail that any intervention on one of them is a fat-handed intervention:
two variables in a feedback relation might be mutually manipulable and they
could still be subject to ideal interventions.
Second, (F) provides a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Any time we
have a fat-handed intervention between two variables we cannot infer that we
are talking about a constitutive relevance relation in a mechanism. As mentioned
before when discussing treatments with side-effects, some fat-handed interven-
tions are so because they aren’t refined enough to have a localized effect in one
variable only. Other fat-handed interventions, however, are so because they tar-
get variables for both a mechanism and its components. This latter type is the
one that explains (away) inter-level causal relations.
Third, fat-handed interventions such as I in Figure 6 may affect several vari-
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ables (more than two) at two levels simultaneously. For instance, since ry is also
a component in ys, by (F), I is also an intervention on ry. I don’t show the arrow
that represents that causal relation for simplicity. One practical limitation of the
representation is that the diagrams get cumbersome even with a small number
of variables.
At this point, the reader might have an idea of how the argument against the
inter-level causation thesis looks. In the next section I make it explicit.
3.3. ARGUMENT AGAINST INTER-LEVEL CAUSATION IN A MECHANISM AND
INCOHERENCE REVISITED
Using (F) it is possible to formulate an argument against inter-level mechanistic
causation straightforwardly. Let ys and fx be two variables such that fx is at a
lower mechanistic level than ys. Suppose for reductio that ys causes fx (i.e., top-
down causation). Hence, according to (M), there is an ideal intervention I on ys
that will change the value of fx when all variables other than fx and ys are fixed
at some value. By condition 1 in (M*), I causes ys. And by condition 3 in (M*), I
does not directly cause fx. Since fx is at a lower mechanistic level than ys, fx is a
component in ys by (L). Therefore, by (F), I is also necessarily an intervention on
fx. Hence, I causes fx. Contradiction. Hence, ys does not cause fx, which means
that there is no top-down causation. A similar argument inverting the order of
the variables shows that there is no bottom-up causation. Therefore, there is no
inter-level causation between fx and ys.
It is worth stressing that the argument not only shows that interventions do
not provide evidence of inter-level causal relations, but also that they cannot pro-
vide such evidence. All the interventions that discover constitutive relevance
relations are not ideal interventions in the sense of (M*).
Let me discuss briefly the implications of this argument for the problems in
section 2.3. If my argument is right, then thesis (ILC) is false, so the problems of
cyclicity and redundancy don’t get off the ground.
1. Redundancy Problem Revisited. In my proposal there are no violations of the
closure principle (i.e., the idea that for every physical property P, there is a
set of sufficient physical causes P*) given that all active entities are physical.
Therefore, all causes and effects are physical. Questions such as “what is
the most fundamental level in causal terms?” or “what is the level in which
causation is really taking place?” are misleading. Assuming intervention-
ism, causation is well-defined at different levels. Causal relations occur
at different levels because at different levels we can find some changes in
variables that produce changes in other variables. On the other hand, since
there is no top-down causation there are no problems of higher-level enti-
ties exerting redundant causal influences on lower-level entities.
2. Cyclicity Problem Revisited. While there are cycles of correlations between
levels, there are no causal cycles between amechanism and its components.
Take fx and ys such that there is causal cycle between them. It follows that
fx and ys are correlated, fx causes ys, and ys causes fx. Given that fx
causes ys, then by (M) there is an ideal intervention I on fx that will change
the value of ys when all variables other than fx and ys are fixed at some
value. Since I is ideal, it does not cause ys. Hence, by the contrapositive of
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(F), fx is not a component in ys. This case could be interpreted as a case of
feedback between two different mechanisms.
Now I will discuss four remaining potential worries about my proposal.
1. Does the proposal really preserve Craver’s mutual manipulability theory? My
proposal calls for a reinterpretation of Craver’s formulation of mutual manipu-
lability. He defines mutual manipulability in terms of ideal interventions (Craver,
2007, p. 154), an aspect of the theory that I stated in (MM1) in section 2.2. But if
(F) is correct, then interventions in inter-level experiments are never ideal in the
interventionist sense. Does the mutual manipulability theorist have to be com-
mitted to the interventionist notion of ideal intervention? I don’t think so. To
preserve the insight of the theory, the mutual manipulability theorist requires a
notion of intervention that does not include (I1c) in section 2.2. Such a notion
is weaker than the interventionist notion. It is beyond the scope of this paper,
however, to provide a fully worked-out alternative.
2. Does the argument prove that there is not inter-level causation at all? One can
be worried that the argument I have provided proves too much, ruling out inter-
level causation in all cases. In response, I think it is worth stressing that in order
for the argument to work, we need the two entities in question to be in a con-
stitutive relevance (i.e., compositional) relation. If that is not the case, then it is
not possible to appeal to definition (F). Hence, the argument concerns the issue of
inter-level causationwithin a singlemechanism, and does not say anything about
the inter-level causation between components of different mechanisms. The puz-
zling issue is, however, the former. Inter-level causation is problematic in cases
in which there is a compositional relation between entities in the levels that we
consider, such as within amechanism. To address the latter issue, wewould need
a notion of levels different from the notion used here (i.e., levels have local sig-
nificance, and the predicate “x is at a lower level than y” is defined only within a
mechanism, as discussed in section 2.2).
3. Can the proposal account for undetectable changes? Recall that lesion exper-
iments suggest that the fusiform gyrus is relevant in the mechanism for face
recognition. But presumably, if you destroy one single neuron in the fusiform
gyrus, you won’t observe a change in face recognition performance. In such a
case, it seems that we have a case of composition, and a fat-handed intervention
that does not bring about effects in both high-level and low-level variables. I
think, however, that this is not a case of composition. The fact that we can create
a sorites paradox, because at some point destroying n neurons would result in
an observable change, suggests that we can treat “being constitutively relevant”
as a vague predicate. We have clear cases at both ends, and borderline cases in
between. The activation of an individual neuron is not constitutively relevant for
face recognition, but the variable that measures the activation of, say, n neurons
is. Mutual manipulations try to identify the clear cases, and I think (F) works for
those.
This objection is also avoided by (MM2) being a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for constitutive relevance.
4. Does the distinction between fat-handed and ideal interventions depend on what
we are interested in? In my proposal, whether an intervention is fat-handed or
not depends on the context, and this could seem worrisome from a metaphysi-
cal perspective. Here is an example of the worry: suppose we are working with
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variables for activities at one level (e.g., cellular), and we identify an ideal inter-
vention I on variable fx with respect to ry. Now, suppose we recognize a lower
level (e.g. molecular), and we observe that a variable lp at such level is a com-
ponent in fx. This implies that I is also a cause of lp, which raises the question,
is I really an ideal intervention or really a fat-handed intervention? I don’t think
that this sort of context dependence has problematic metaphysical implications.
It would be worrisome if, given a set of variables to work with, it could turn out
that I could be seen as ideal or fat-handed (i.e., because the question of whether
there is a causal relation or not would not be settled). But once we fix the set
of variables, interventions are of one kind only (i.e, ideal or fat-handed). This
response is partial, however, because it is fair to say that it pushes the problem
back to another one: how do we identify the appropriate set of variables to study
a phenomenon? This is an important open problem that has a wider reach than
my proposal: there is no complete theory about what being well-defined vari-
able amounts to. And interventionism, the mutual manipulability theory, and
my proposal presuppose a set of well-defined variables to work with.
As I suggested, giving up the triad has theoretical costs, because the three
views integrate important concepts in the mechanisms literature, such as level,
constitutive relevance, and causation. At this point, however, some readersmight
not be entirely persuaded by my dissolution attempt, and could still think that
the triad is indeed inconsistent. Hence, before concluding, I will briefly discuss
the alternatives available to try to solve the inconsistency by rejecting one of the
three views.
4. SOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY BY REJECTING ONE OF THE THREE VIEWS
4.1. WEAKEN OR REJECT THE INTERVENTIONIST VIEW
One way around the triad is to weaken interventionism. The theory, however,
is open to several interpretations, so how we can weaken it would depend on
that. In Making Things Happen, Woodward stresses emphatically that his project
is “semantic” (2003, p.28). This, however, does not mean that he intends to offer
a conceptual analysis of “cause” and its uses in ordinary and scientific contexts,
uses that he regards as sometimes unclear and ambiguous. That is, even though
his project attempts to account for familiar intuitions about causal explanations,
it is not merely descriptive; it also has a normative component: it makes “recom-
mendations about what one ought to mean by various causal and explanatory
terms” (Woodward, 2003, p. 7).
Nonetheless, it is possible to read interventionism as a theory that has broader
epistemological and metaphysical implications. The epistemological reading I
think is natural, because (M) establishes a connection between controlled experi-
ments and the concept of causation. Nonetheless, interventionism has to be dis-
tinguished (as Woodward himself acknowledges) from the project of inferring
and discovering causal relations from statistical data (Pearl, 2000), a project that
can also be characterized as epistemological.
Now, whether we can read interventionism as ametaphysical theory is amore
contentious issue. Woodward tries not commit himself to such a reading inMak-
ing Things Happen. He says “I leave it to the reader to decide whether [inter-
ventionism] counts as discovering ‘what causation is’ ” (Woodward, 2003, p. 7).
More recently, however, his stance is less neutral, and he as defended interven-
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tionism as “a contribution to methodology rather than a set of theses about the
ontology or metaphysics of causation” (Woodward, 2014).
I think the fact that the original formulation of the theory is silent about meta-
physics, leaves open the possibility to use the theory in contexts that are tra-
ditionally regarded as the domain of metaphysics, something that he and oth-
ers have done. In particular, interventionism has been applied in discussions
about the causal exclusion arguments advanced by Kim (see Woodward, 2008b;
Raatikainen, 2010). Such a metaphysical reading raises worries for philosophers
interested in the metaphysics of causation. Glennan, for example, says that inter-
ventionism makes “an important point about the epistemology of causation” be-
cause “experimental manipulations can provide evidence that variables are con-
nected, even in the absence of mechanical knowledge of how they are connected”
but “this epistemologically important point does not legitimate [interventionism]
as a metaphysical account of causation”(Glennan, 2009, p. 318). I think the root
of such metaphysical worries is the fact that interventionism explains causation
as a relation between variables, rather than a relation between objects. For exam-
ple, in some metaphysical pictures, causation is a relation between entities at the
fundamental physical level of reality (Heil, 2003), which excludes many of the
relations that the interventionist talks about.
Having these metaphysical worries in mind, one might be inclined to weaken
interventionism arguing that the existence of an ideal intervention is not a suffi-
cient condition for a causal relation. That is, we could weaken interventionism
by breaking the biconditional expressed by (M) in section 2.1, accepting only the
necessity claim. Roughly: if X is a direct cause of Y, then there is (in principle) an
ideal intervention on X that produces a change in Y (while keeping everything
else constant), but not the converse. This solution, however, has an epistemolog-
ical cost, because it implies that the relationship between X and Y might not be
causal, even if there is an ideal intervention on X that has an effect on Y. In other
words, even if one doubts interventionism as a complete story about the nature
of causation, from an epistemological point of view, it is the sufficiency part of
(M) that matters the most.
A second alternative is to simply reject the semantic and metaphysical read-
ings of interventionism. To do this, one could draw a distinction between cau-
sation and causal explanation, and argue that interventionism is not a theory of
causation but a theory of causal explanation, where causal explanation is strictly
an epistemic notion. This would require replacing all the instances of “cause”
with “causal explanation” in the formulation of interventionism. Roughly, for
instance, (M) would be: X is a causal explanation of Y iff there is (in principle) an
ideal intervention on X that produces a change in Y. I think such a change would
eliminate the tension with Craver’s mutual manipulability view, because the sort
of inter-level relations implied by the modified theory would not be causal, and
therefore would not have to be considered a metaphysical problem. Nonethe-
less, if we separate the two projects, we would then have to adopt (or develop) a
theory about the nature of causation, and after having such a theory, we would
still have to answer the question about the relation between causal explanations
and genuine causal relations. This alternative might not seem so problematic for
supporters of other theories of causation, but we would have to assess whether
such theories preserve the virtues of interventionism in other contexts.
If we don’t reject interventionism, another alternative is to weaken or reject
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mutual manipulability.3
4.2. WEAKEN OR REJECT THE MUTUAL MANIPULABILITY ACCOUNT
Craver’s critics (Leuridan, 2012) have suggested rejecting mutual manipulabil-
ity on the grounds that, given its use of Woodward’s interventionism, it seems
to entail that inter-level relations are causal, a consequence that we have inde-
pendent reasons to reject. This creates a problem, for we would need an ac-
count of constitutive relevance to replace mutual manipulability. However, one
might ask, why would we want an account of constitutive relevance in the first
place? Someone, perhaps with reductionist leanings, could argue that there is
something wrong in the very idea of constitutive relevance. I won’t explore such
avenue here, because I’m assuming the tenet of mechanistic philosophy, accord-
ing to which mechanisms are multi-level structures, whose description involves
identifying components. If one accepts this, I think dismissing mutual manipu-
lability on the grounds of the aforementioned tension would be too quick. As I
said before, I think it is important to preserve the fact that mutual manipulabil-
ity articulates a connection between very common kinds of experiments in the
biological sciences (i.e., top-down and bottom-up experiments) and the task of
describing mechanisms.
I think the insight of mutual manipulability is primarily epistemic. The rea-
son is that mutual manipulability, as stated in (MM2), does not offer a necessary
condition for constitutive relevance, which suggests that it is not a theory about
the nature of the constitutive relevance relation. Having that in mind, and the
fact that (MM2) is a sufficient condition, we can congenially understand the the-
ory as an attempt to characterize practices that are sufficient for scientists to dis-
cover constitutive relevance relations, and is also silent about the nature of such
relations.
There are other alternative accounts, which perhaps address more directly the
question about the nature of the constitutive relevance relation. I don’t intend to
offer full criticisms of them, but I will mention them briefly. The first alterna-
tive is to explain constitutive relevance in terms of density of relations between
components (Haugeland, 1998, p. 215). According to this alternative, given a
mechanism ys, the interactions between a component fx and the rest of com-
ponents of ys are greater than the interactions between fx and other ry that are
not components in ys. This alternative, however, does not allow us to distinguish
genuine components frommere correlates, because the latter might be as densely
connected to the mechanism as the former (Craver, 2007, p.142–144).
More recently, Couch (2011) proposed another alternative account of consti-
tutive relevance appealing to Mackie’s notion of INUS conditions. That is, to
“define a relevant part as an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unneces-
sary but sufficient mechanism that serves as the realization of some capacity.”
However, this proposal, as Couch himself acknowledges, “provides an explana-
tion of what the relevance relation is, and not of the evidence we have for it”
(Couch, 2011), so if it goes through, we would still need a further story about the
epistemology of this relation.
Another recent alternative, along with other reasons to reject mutual manip-
ulability, is proposed by Fagan (2012). She regards mechanistic explanations as
3Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Synthese for pushing me to clarify this section.
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bottom-up, and appeals to a notion of “jointness”, which emphasizes the “in-
terdependence among causally active components of a mechanism”, rather than
modularity of components. In her view, the joint activity of a complex of compo-
nents is the explanans of higher-level phenomena (Fagan, 2012, pp.463–468).
4.3. WEAKEN OR REJECT THE INCOHERENCE OF INTER-LEVEL CAUSATION
Finally, we could preserve mutual manipulability and interventionism in its se-
mantic reading, at the cost of rejecting the incoherence of inter-level causes. I
think there are two ways of doing this. First, one could argue that there is no
fundamental distinction between causation and composition, perhaps on the
grounds that both relations can be ultimately modeled using the same formal
tools (e.g., structural equations). Schaffer, for instance, says that “causation links
the world across time, [and] grounding [composition] links the world across lev-
els” (Schaffer, 2012). However, most philosophers would be uncomfortable with
such a conclusion.
A second, perhaps less controversial way, is to embrace inter-level causation.
One recent attempt to do this in the context of mechanisms, precisely to address
problems in Craver’s mutual manipulability theory is (Harinen, in press). Strong
emergence theorists, for instance, might find this solution appealing. If higher-
level mechanisms can have properties that are non-reducible to the organization
of their components, it is possible to conceive them as causes of the behavior of
such components.
I won’t provide here a more detailed analysis of these options, but I want to
stress that solving the problem by giving up any view in the triad has important
epistemological and metaphysical costs. In this paper, I have proposed a way
of dissolving the problem, rather than solving it. And if I’m right, the costs of
rejecting any one view can be avoided.
5. CONCLUSION
Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for there to be causal relations. I have shown that such a view, sup-
plemented by the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance, im-
plies problematic theses about inter-level causation. Prima facie, we can avoid
this problem either by rejecting interventionism or mutual manipulability, or by
embracing inter-level causation. I have tried to articulate, however, one plau-
sible interpretation of interventionism, mutual manipulability and the incoher-
ence of inter-level causation on which there is no tension between them. I have
shown a way of explaining inter-level mechanistic relations without appealing
to inter-level causal claims. On this view, fat-handedness provides a metaphys-
ically sound way of thinking about interventions in mechanisms. The correla-
tions between what takes place at different levels are explained by the fact that
the mechanism and its components (organized and working in the right way) are
the same entity. And as such, causal influences are exerted on the the different
levels simultaneously. In this way, there are no inter-level causal relations be-
tween mechanisms and components. Furthermore, there can’t be such relations,
because there are not ideal interventions that account for them, in the way that
the interventionist view requires.
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